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Director Incentives in the Labour Market, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance

This project investigates the impact of director reputational incentives in the labour market on director monitoring, corporate governance, and firm performance. Hand-collecting a sample of retired CEO directors, we study the impact of their CEO retirement announcements on the value of the firms in which they continue to hold outside directorships, and whether post-retirement diminishing incentives in the director labour market wield real impact on the quality and intensity of retired CEO director monitoring and on governance. We aim at providing direct and empirical evidence of the incentives of independent directors on firm governance and performance.

Project Title: Director Incentives in the Labour Market, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance

PI: Bang Dang Nguyen

Project Update - April 2019

Project Update - August 2018

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CERF Scholar Shiqi Chen presented her paper at Leeds University Business School

Jun 28, 2019

Shiqi Chen presented her paper entitled “Financial Policies and Internal Governance with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences” (joint with Bart Lambrecht) in the Accounting and Finance seminar at Leeds University Business School, the Finance seminar at Essex Business School, CERF Lunch Seminar at Cambridge Judge Business School, and at the 2019 Annual Real Options Conference in London.

Winners of the Best Student Paper Award 2019 were announced

Jun 17, 2019

At the end of term staff-student lunch at the Cambridge Judge Business School on 14 June

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