Jisok Kang obtained his PhD in 2016, from Schulich School of Business, York University, Canada and joined CERF in September 2016
Research Agenda: the effect of better (and more) disclosure on executive compensation
This is an empirical study but based on a theory paper, titled as “Information disclosure and corporate governance (JF, 2012).” Unlike a common belief in corporate governance discussions that better disclosure boosts a firm’s value by alleviating the agency problem, the paper shows that better (and more) disclosure could induce the higher level of executive compensation, thus reduce shareholders’ wealth. We empirically test this theoretical endeavour on an international setting. We have found that the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which is assumed to enforce better disclosure and monitoring in many countries indeed has a positive correlation with the executive compensation level. We now search for other proxies for the extent of disclosure and monitoring.