To CERF Board Members:

The final part of my CERF Fellowship has been very productive both in terms of involvement in CERF activities and the completion of the project I proposed to undertake at the beginning of my fellowship.

Two recent highlights of my involvement at CERF have been the organization of a seminar and my talk at the Cambridge-Lausanne Workshop. In February 2018 I was the host for Nobuyuki (Nobi) Hanaki from the University of Nice who presented a paper on experimental asset markets. The talk was very well-received and Nobi’s two-day visit was an invaluable opportunity to lay the foundations for a future collaboration. On March 23rd 2018 I gave a talk on “Financial contagion in networks: A market experiment” at the inaugural Cambridge-Lausanne Workshop organized by CERF. As described in detail below and the companion grant report, this work was the project, partly funded by CERF, I completed during my CERF Fellowship and the workshop provided an excellent opportunity to receive feedback from the broader finance community.

Below is the final report for the project “An experimental study of financial contagion in networks” which I have pursued during my CERF Fellowship.

The 2008 global financial crisis highlighted the crucial role that the network architecture of the financial system plays in determining systemic contagion. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Bank of England argued that “the financial network should be structured so as to reduce the chances of future systemic collapse” and “better information on connections between firms in the financial network [is crucial to] building a more resilient financial system”.

My project investigates experimentally the roles of network and information structures on financial contagion, price formation, and the behaviour of traders. Participants have heterogeneous valuations for assets and they are assigned to a position in a network of liabilities that leaves them exposed to counterparty risk. One participant is hit by a shock whose size is common knowledge. Participants can trade assets in a double auction market and they face a trade-off: buy to earn a long-term return from the assets vs. sell to raise liquidity to cushion the potential spillovers from the shock.

The paper is completed and it is available as a CERF working paper with the title: “Financial contagion in networks: A market experiment.” We find that network structure has a
significant impact on the resilience of the system to shocks. Financial contagion and individual bankruptcy are much more likely in core-periphery compared to circle networks. In core-periphery networks, the traders perceive this heightened risk leading to collapse in prices and a market freeze where everyone is trying to sell assets. In contrast, in circle networks the market functions normally. Whether market participants have information about the location of the shock in the network, however, has no substantial effect on financial contagion, individual bankruptcy, the evolution of prices, or traders’ bidding behaviour.

I have presented the results at the University of Oxford, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), National University of Singapore, University of Macau, the BiNoMa Workshop on the Economics of Networks at the University of East Anglia, the Cambridge-INET Networks Working Group, Paris School of Economics, University of Amsterdam, University of Nice, and the Stony Brook Game Theory Workshop.

Yours ever,

Edoardo Gallo